


























uring a scene in the film Okja (2017), 
the image of a human character 
running his hand along the body of the 
titular super pig prompted me to recall an 
experience from earlier in my life. At around age 
thirteen, I was allowed to assist at the delivery of 
a litter of puppies. The mother of the litter was a 
rough collie – a ‘Lassie' type dog- who had been 
running loose for more than two weeks on a 
playing field nearby our home. All attempts to 
catch her had failed until finally, heavily pregnant 
she was cornered by a well-meaning member of 
the public and she ended up, as so many other 
homeless dogs and cats did, at our house. Within 
thirty-six hours of arriving in our kitchen and 
being given a bed, some water and food, she 
began to pant heavily and shudder as her labour 
started. I was kept at a distance at first only able 
to observe quietly as she gave birth. One by one, 
six puppies arrived but the weeks of being 
homeless and whatever other traumas had been 
inflicted on the mother took a massive toll. Four 
of the six puppies, despite resuscitation efforts, 
never took a breath. As an assistant to these 
births and deaths, my job, unexpectedly, 
became to help to remove the bodies of the 
dead puppies and wrap them in newspaper. 
When I felt the first small body in my hands, I was 
immediately struck by a sense memory 
connection. I was shocked that touching the 
dead puppy triggered a sense memory of 
chicken. Not live chickens but the fragmented 
dead bodies of chickens that I, like so many other 
working-class kids, habitually ate for dinner. 
Looking at the puppy and experiencing the feel 
of her cold soft body threw my previously 
unquestioned certainty about socially prescribed 
categories of ‘pet’ and ‘food’ into complete 
disarray. While my visual sense confirmed their 
species differences and despite the feel of cold 
damp fur instead of plucked uncooked skin, the 
touch of her body, the feel of plump fleshiness to 
my fingers reaffirmed their similitude. I cried for 
that puppy who I understood as an individual 
being, but in the moment of ‘feeling’ her as ‘like 
chicken’ was unable to relate the sensory 
experience to this chicken or that individual 
chicken, only ‘chicken’. 
This phenomenological experience 
stands out in my life as I felt it viscerally, the 
sensory affective jolt was prior to the cognitive 
process of recognition. It was from that 
experience that I began my transition to 
veganism. Later, I had to recalibrate my belief 
that when I held that puppy, that was the first 
time I had held a dead baby animal. Of course, I 
realised, I had held and consumed the body parts 
of many dead animals, the majority of whom, as  
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standardised animal-industrial practices dictate, 
would have been young when they were killed. 
Okja, a Netflix original film directed by Bong 
Joon-ho in which the main character is a CGI 
genetically modified ‘super pig’, reminded me of 
that childhood experience. That memory 
prompts this essay in which I explore the 
relationship between touching and seeing 
through the lens of phenomenological 
experience, framed by the concepts of 
embodied visuality, haptic and optical images. 
Although the focus of such an approach within 
film criticism has been on human embodiment, 
in this essay I explore its usefulness for thinking 
critically about human-animal relationships and 
the affective mediated experience of other 
subjectivities. With a focus on ‘touch’ I consider 
the sensual relationship between ‘subjective 
matter’ and the onscreen animal body. I have 
written elsewhere on the ethical issues that are 
raised when live animals are used for the 
purposes of entertainment media (see: Molloy 
2011; Molloy 2012). For this reason, I focus on 
Okja and the CGI super pig character to explore 
how the subject-object politics of human-animal 
relationships are encoded in haptic and optical 
images. In this essay, I discuss the different types 
of touch present in Okja and the processes of 
identification in terms of primary engagement 
with ‘the sense and sensibility of materiality 
itself’ (Sobchack 2004, 65). 
Embodied visuality 
In Carnal Thoughts, Vivian Sobchack writes about 
the embodied experience of film that, ‘we do not 
experience any movie only through our eyes. We 
see and comprehend and feel films with our 
entire bodily being, informed by the full history 
and carnal knowledge of our acculturated 
sensorium’ (Sobchack 2004, 63). When we watch 
a film we shudder, our pulse increases, our skin 
tingles, we become aroused, we salivate, we feel 
in the presence of audiovisual imagery. A film can 
act as a sensuous stimulus, an experience of 
embodied vicarious sensation. As Sobchack 
observes, film viewing engages much more than 
our eyes yet theories of spectatorial identification 
from the psychoanalytic and semiotic traditions 
have focused on the visual aspects of the film 
experience. This tendency towards ocularcentrism 
in film theory has taken little account of the 
embodied subject and their multisensorial 
engagement.   The   question   of   how  meaning is  
made and its relationship to spectatorial 
identification has, in those traditions, been 
inclined to grant privilege to the visual and the 
rational, the eye and the mind. The messiness of 
the body and our embodied encounters with 
film are at odds with the intellectual sensibilities 
of much film theory with its preference for 
critical distance, rigour, objectivity and disdain 
for the crudity of emotional or sensuous 
excesses. With few exceptions, Sobchack writes, 
‘film theory has attempted … to put the 
ambiguous and unruly, subjectively sensuous, 
embodied experience of going to the movies 
back where it “properly” – that is, objectively – 
belongs” (Sobchack 2004, 59). The sensuous, she 
argues, is located ‘on the screen as the semiotic 
effects of cinematic representation … or off the 
screen in the spectator’s phantasmatic psychic 
formations, cognitive processes and basic 
physiological reflexes that do not pose major 
questions of meaning’ (2004, 59-60). While 
there is no question that they are valuable, these 
approaches do however struggle to take account 
of what happens between the materiality of 
bodies off-screen and the experience of ‘matter’ 
on screen. 
Phenomenological approaches, by way 
of a contrast, can instead provide a framework that 
pays attention to sense experience and embodied 
seeing. As Laura U. Marks proposes through her 
theory of embodied visuality: ‘Film is not grasped 
solely by an intellectual act but by the complex 
perception of the body as a whole. This view of 
perception implies an attitude towards the object, 
in this case, a film, not as something that must be 
analyzed and deciphered in order to deliver forth 
its meaning but as something that means in itself' 
(Marks 2000, 145). To acknowledge the bodiless 
of our experience of the movies requires that we 
must recognize the multimodal sensory 
capacities beyond seeing and hearing that are 
active in the ‘lived body'. Smell, taste, touch, and 
proprioception, as well as vision and hearing, 
make the film experience meaningful. The film 
viewer’s lived body, Sobchack argues, ‘both 
provide and enacts a commutative reversibility 
between subjective feeling and objective 
knowledge, between the senses and their sense 
of common meaning’ (2004, 61). Where our 
bodies respond to a film without being 
translated first through thought, body and image 
are in a reciprocal state, they are ‘surfaces in 
contact’; an experience that prompts Sobchack 
to   argue   that   we   must  be   attentive  to   our  
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‘primary engagement … with the sense and 
sensibility of materiality itself’ (Sobchack 2004, 
65). ‘We are’ she contends ‘subjective matter: 
our lived bodies sensually relate to “things” that 
“matter” on the screen and find them sensible in 
a primary, prepersonal and global way […]’ 
(2004, 65). 
The phenomenological experience is 
an engagement with material subjectivity but 
also a diffused response that blurs the distance 
between image and viewer that some other 
traditions in film theory prefer to amplify. In 
Sobchack’s account at least, she is ‘able both to 
sense and to be sensible, to be both the subject 
and the object of tactile desire’ and, she argues, 
all bodies in the film experience, both off screen 
and on screen may be part of this dynamic such 
that ‘meaning, and where it is made does not 
have a discrete origin in either spectators’ bodies 
or cinematic representation but emerges in their 
conjunction’ (Sobchack 2004). By acknowledging 
the reciprocity of image and body, a ‘tactile 
epistemology’ (Marks 2000) challenges the 
distance privileged by ocularcentrism. As David 
Ingram remarks in relation to eco-cinema, the 
primacy granted to vision and visuality is 
considered ‘a central factor in dominant notions 
of both rationality and capitalist economics’ that 
has ‘produced a dangerous sense of detachment 
from the environment’ (Ingram 2014, 26). 
Because phenomenology acknowledges the 
materiality of bodies on and off-screen and the 
sensual affective experience of the film 
encounter and in doing so opposes ocularcentric 
detachment, Ingram suggests that such an 
approach might be useful for eco-film studies. 
On this point, I agree with Ingram and I further 
propose that such an approach may be 
beneficial to Critical Animal Studies in that it 
offers a way to explore the affective dimensions 
of the mediated encounter with other species 
and the politics of embodied cultural knowledge. 
Acknowledgement of another subjectivity 
recognizes the value of that being and can be 
significant in the establishment of empathetic 
relationships with nonhuman animals. As Elisa 
Aaltola argues ‘emotions and forms of empathy 
rescue us from detachment, numbness and the 
objectification of others and enable the sort of 
moral agency resistant to subjugation and 
violence’ (Aaltola 2018, 2). Aaltola also points 
out that empathy takes different forms and 
narratives of animal lives while inviting the 
viewer    or   reader    to    feel    empathy,   might  
depoliticise, dehistoricize or aestheticize animal 
experience and in doing so occlude their 
material realities and suffering. She argues 
instead for narratives that invite ‘simulative 
empathy’ by ‘making evident the historical, 
cultural or political causes of, for instance, 
suffering’ and stories that make the effort to 
‘contextualize the emotions of the animals’ and 
‘highlight the solid, raw subjectivity of those 
animals and offer ways for the audience to 
better the situation’ (Aaltola 2018, 45). Empathy, 
however, is easily managed through popular 
culture, the danger being that pleasurable 
empathy is forgotten once the narrative is over. 
Aaltola describes this as ‘bite-size' empathy, a 
means by which the viewer can edit what they 
wish to absorb: ‘It is this', Aaltola writes ‘that 
enables moral and political passivity, for the type 
of discomfort often required for one to truly 
grasp the causes and intensities of others' 
suffering, and to be stirred into questioning 
one's own culturally loaded beliefs' (Aaltola 
2018, 42). To counter this, stories should be 
political, they should be more than simply 
pleasurable, they should be willing to confront 
realities and give context to the lives of other 
animals that pay regard to their subjectivity. In 
addition to this though, a problem with 
simulative empathy and the film experience is, 
for Aaltola, that it ‘reaffirms the notion that an 
abyss lies between ourselves and others’ such 
that ‘efforts to project and simulate are 
ultimately like throwing ropes from one prison 
tower to another: the ropes’ she writes ‘can 
create connections, but nonetheless the 
prisoners remain separated in their states of 
isolation’ (Aaltola 2018, 48). The answer then is 
embodied encounters which are attentive to the 
subjectivity of others. 
Certainly, the film encounter is not a 
material encounter between two lived bodies and 
the act of mediation precludes the dynamic 
engagement of intersubjectivity that might 
happen with direct embodied contact. Embodied 
visuality is a relationship between the viewer and 
the image of an animal. As the animal is not 
physically present, the process of mediation can 
impose an ocularcentric distance between viewer 
and animal that encourages a form of 
anthropocentric anthropomorphism; that is, the 
humanisation of nonhuman animals which denies 
their subjectivity, individual experiences and 
species-specific capacities (Parkinson 2018). The 
mediation of a nonhuman animal’s experience by  
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Secondly, simulative empathy invited by a film 
narrative can be informed by previous 
embodied encounters with other animals. 
Indeed, it is by acknowledging the embodied 
and multisensory experience of our encounters 
with other animals that the viewer can recruit 
those sense memories in the context of 
embodied visuality and the film experience. As 
Aaltola contends, we do not have ‘to have direct 
embodied contact with all those we empathize 
with. What suffices is that we have some of such 
contact with other animals, which we can then 
use as a platform on the basis of which to 
approach those we never encounter’ (Aaltola 
2018, 49). The memory of such encounters 
might be then invited by haptic imagery in the 
film experience when the ’engagement of the 
haptic viewer occurs not simply in psychic 
registers but in the sensorium’ (Marks 2002, 18). 
This does not mean that all viewers will respond 
in the same way. Indeed, Marks points out that 
‘Haptic     cinema     appeals    to    a     viewer  who  
perceives with all the senses. It involves thinking 
with your skin’ (Marks 2002, 18); it is concerned 
with a perceiving body and visual touch.  
Touch 
In De Anima, Aristotle writes ‘something is an 
animal primarily because of perception. For even 
those who do not move or change place, but 
which have perception, we call animals and not 
merely alive. The primary form of perception 
which belongs to all animals is touch’ (Aristotle 
[trans. Shields] 2016, 25). According to Aristotle, 
touch is necessary for animal existence while the 
other senses are for the sake of ‘living well’. 
Touch is indeed shared across most species of 
mammals, it is the first sense to develop and in 
humans this occurs in the womb at around eight 
weeks. The pleasures of touch in species other 
than humans have been little investigated 
although humans have exploited touch as a 
means by which anthropocentric benchmarks 
can be reinforced. For instance, the mirror test, a 
method used to measure self-awareness involves 
showing a marked animal their mirrored self and 
judges their levels of self-recognition by whether 
or not they touch the mark on their bodies. Few 
species other than humans have been admitted 
to the ranks of the ‘self-aware’ via this mechanism 
where touch is established within scientific 
discourse as an indicator of (human) 
exceptionalism. There are, of course, many other 
ways in which touch is an exploitative action, even 
an act of violence perpetrated by humans upon 
multiple animal bodies. Touch is emphasised in 
Temple Grandin’s writing where she discusses 
certain kinds of touch as having a commonality of 
experience shared by her and other animals, 
particularly cows. ‘My need for touch’ she 
explains, ‘started my interest in cattle’ (Grandin 
2008, 252). ‘Firm touch’ she continues, ‘has a 
calming effect, while a light tickle touch is likely 
to set off a flight reaction’ (Grandin 2008, 252). 
Envisioning the technology of a restraint chute as 
an extension of her own arms and hands, Grandin 
explains that she could ‘hold the animal gently’ for 
slaughter. This realisation assisted Grandin is the 
design of chutes for feed yards and slaughter 
plants. For Grandin, a nuanced and shared 
understanding of touch in cattle is translated into a 
biological-technological controlling ‘touch’ in 
service to the animal-industrial complex: A means 
by which other sentient beings can be killed in a 
way   that   is   less   troubling   or   troublesome  for  
55 
humans (and a representation of which 
features in Okja). Elsewhere, the largescale 
commodification of touch is evident in the 
various visitor and tourist attractions that give 
humans license to impose their touch on other 
animals; semi-tranquilised lions and tigers are 
hugged and petted, elephants ridden and 
dolphins and other marine mammals are 
subjected to human physical contact and other 
traumatic interactions (see: Molloy, 2011). The 
pleasures of these various types of multispecies 
touch are designed to be human-centred and 
little value is accorded to the embodied 
subjective experience of the nonhuman animal 
in these interactions. This inequity of pleasure 
is justified through the rationality of capitalistic 
enterprise and the anthropocentricity of 
anthropomorphism that pervades so many 
human-animal encounters. 
Sobchack and Marks both place 
emphasis on touch in their accounts of embodied 
visuality. For Sobchack, her experience of The Piano 
(Campion, 1993) for example ‘was a heightened 
instance of our common sensuous experience of 
the movies: the way we are in some carnal 
modality about to touch and be touched by the 
substance and texture of images’ (Sobchack 2004, 
82). Sobchack remarks pointedly ‘Vision may be 
the sense most privileged in the culture and the 
cinema, with hearing a close second; nonetheless, 
I do not leave my capacity to touch or to smell or to 
taste at the door' (Sobcheck 2004, 64-5). ‘A visual 
medium that appeals to the sense of touch’, writes 
Marks, ‘must be beheld by a whole body’ (Marks 
2002, 12). In her discussion of haptic visuality, 
Marks contends that ‘the eyes themselves function 
like organs of touch’ and that haptic images are 
those that ‘do not invite identification with a figure 
so much as they encourage a bodily relationship 
between the viewer and the image’ (Marks 2002, 
2-3). Haptic images are often those that prevent 
the viewer from apprehending the object and 
therefore make them reliant on other sense 
perceptions to overcome limited visual 
information (Marks 2002, 133). This can be due to 
the ‘closeness’ of the imagery, or a movement 
away from figures so that they are not represented 
fully. Memory is crucial in this regard and while film 
cannot ‘stimulate the precise memories’, Marks 
argues, haptic images ‘ask memory to draw on 
other associations' (Marks 2002, 133). In this way, 
‘because haptic images locate vision in the body, 
they make vision more like a contact sense, such as 
touch  or  smell’  (Marks 2002, 133)  and  so  haptic  
visuality makes apparent the role of the other 
senses in the process of seeing. Haptic perception, 
therefore, combines tactile, kinaesthetic and 
proprioceptive functions in a way that contrasts 
haptic visuality with optical visuality, placing both 
on a continuum that moves from multisensory to 
solely optical. This relationship is important and the 
shift in focus and distance between optical and 
haptic is one that can change the viewer’s 
engagement with the image from visual to 
embodied. There is then a corresponding 
relationship between engagement with a film as a 
distanced objective view and as a multi-sensorial 
experience.  
Tactile memories are audiovisually 
encoded and there is a relationship between 
cinematic form and politics. In this sense, although 
phenomenological accounts centralise the 
individual perceiving body and the first-person 
affective embodied response to encounters they 
are also grounded in wider social, cultural and 
historical contexts. Viewers may share the sensual 
experience of a film but their individual response 
will be different and based on their own memories. 
The ‘experience of the body is informed by culture’ 
Marks contends, ‘our bodies encode history, which 
in turn informs how we perceive the world’ (Marks 
2002 ,152). Phenomenology can, she continues, 
‘account for how the body encodes power 
relations somatically. It can acknowledge that 
embodiment is a matter of individual life-maps as 
well as cultural difference’ (Marks 2002, 152). The 
senses are not prediscursive and while Marks 
acknowledges that much sensory experience is 
presymbolic, it is, she argues, cultivated at the level 
of the body. ‘Bodily and sensory experience' she 
proposes is, therefore ‘to a large degree informed 
by culture' (Marks 2002, 145). The cinematic 
encounter is a meeting of two sensoria; that of the 
viewer and the film. ‘We bring our own personal 
and cultural organization of the senses to cinema, 
and cinema brings a particular organization of the 
senses to us, the filmmaker’s own sensorium 
refracted through the cinematic apparatus’ (Marks 
2002, 153). While there is an objection to raise 
around the implied authorial autonomy of ‘the 
filmmaker’ in this sense, the point regarding 
different sensoria remains important in that 
spectatorship is indeed the sensory translation of 
cultural knowledge (Marks 2002). For this reason, 
when viewed outside the cultural context in which 
it was created, some viewers may miss 
multisensory experiences which will be dependent 
on their individual embodied knowledge.  
56 
This notion of cultural context and its 
relationship to the organisation of the senses is 
apparent in my experience of holding the dead 
puppy. At the moment that I experienced the 
tactile similarity between the bodies of two 
different species, my sensual confusion was 
informed by my cultural experience of food and 
more specifically of those animals who are used 
and normalised as food in my cultural 
experience. This was embodied knowledge; my 
embodied knowledge of how chicken ‘feels’ to 
the touch given that the bodies of chickens are 
culturally normalised as food. This is distinct 
from my processing of the event in which the 
social discourse that normalises the classification 
of dogs as ‘pets’ and therefore ‘inedible’ meant 
that the embodied knowledge (my recognition 
of the similarity of ‘touch’) translated the 
moment of sensual confusion between puppy 
and chicken into the recognition of chickens as 
subjects rather than food objects. It did not shift 
my understanding of the puppy from a subject to 
a food object – at no point did I ask why dogs are 
not food- and instead I questioned the legitimacy 
of thinking of chickens as ‘chicken’ the food 
object. In this way, it was embodied knowledge 
and the embodied experience of touch that led 
to the cognitive process of questioning how 
moral difference is normalised and socially 
constructed categories are assigned to other 
beings. The process was embodied, discursive 
and on that occasion; an act of sensory 
translation of cultural knowledge. I return to this 
early experience because it illustrates the 
relationship between cultural norms, embodied 
knowledge and identification, something that 
Marks discusses in relation to films that depict 
dogs as food. 
Identification with other animals 
onscreen is often achieved through the use of 
cinematic conventions such as eyeline matches, 
shot-reverse shot, and point of view shots to 
establish agency and intentionality. Marks 
argues that these conventions support idealizing 
identifications of other animals and points out 
that Western outrage at images of dogs being 
eaten often ignores the oppression of humans 
who are also depicted onscreen as the 
consumers of dog meat. Western cultural norms 
that afford moral privilege to certain animals 
over others are prone, Marks contends, to gross 
inequities of moral concern that pull focus on a 
dog  and  make  invisible  the  suffering  of  other  
humans. Marks contends that ‘the status 
Westerners ascribe to dogs is far higher than that  
they apply to certain third-world people’ and by 
way of a reason for this she suggests that dogs 
are ‘more conducive to projected fellow-feeling 
than are humans who speak an alien language, 
practice strange customs, and, well, eat dogs’ 
(Marks 2002, 31).  The politics of the affective 
discursive dynamic that Marks draws attention 
to is played out through all forms of media and 
in relation to all animals, including humans. 
Those who happen, through cultural norms and 
social discourses, to be ascribed with moral value 
are given forms of visibility that allow for and 
indeed participate in the reinforcement of cross-
species identifications. The oppression and 
suffering of others is often in plain sight but 
made culturally and socially invisible through the 
conventions that only allow identifications with 
those ascribed moral privilege and social value. 
The inequities of this power dynamic are present 
in the normalised imagery of, for instance, a 
human eating an animal product where the 
sentient being whose dismembered body part is 
being consumed is invisible and disallowed any 
opportunity for viewer identification. Okja 
depicts these normalised practices and through 
haptic and optical imagery and on onscreen 
interspecies sensual relationships, the film 
makes apparent the ambivalent subject-object 
identifications between humans and other 
animals. 
Okja 
Directed by Bong Joon-ho, Okja is a Netflix 
original film that had its theatrical premiere at 
Cannes in May 2017 followed by a Netflix release 
in June of the same year. It is the story of a 
genetically modified super pig created by the 
Mirando Corporation who is sent to live for ten 
years with a South Korean farmer and his 
granddaughter, Mija. Along with twenty-five 
other super pigs, Okja is part of a public relations 
stunt designed to soften public resistance to GM 
products. The campaign is spearheaded by the 
self-styled environmentalist CEO who wants the 
corporation to be seen to be addressing the 
global problem of world hunger. At a press 
conference to introduce the super pig project, 
CEO Lucy Mirando declares, “Our super pigs will 
not only be big and beautiful, they will also leave 




Okja, film, promotional poster, 2017 © Plan B Entertainment 
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consume less feed and produce less excretions. 
And most importantly, they need to taste fucking 
good.” When the Mirando Corporation reclaim 
the super pigs after ten years, Mija leaves the 
mountains to rescue Okja and bring her back 
home. An Animal Liberation Front (ALF) group 
who are involved in action to expose the 
Mirando Corporation’s activities become 
involved in Okja’s rescue which culminates at a 
slaughterhouse where hundreds of super-pigs 
are being held in an outside penning area 
surrounded by electric fencing. Mija manages to 
negotiate Okja’s release in exchange for a solid 
gold pig but all the other super pigs, apart from 
one baby who is pushed out between the 
electric fence wires, are left behind to be killed. 
The film is a cautionary tale about corporate 
greed and GM foods set against the background 
issues of environmental crisis and global food 
poverty. The human characters in the film; the 
young girl Mija, Dr. Johnny the narcissistic tv 
naturalist, Animal Liberation Front activists, and 
the Mirando CEOs (twin sisters Lucy and Nancy), 
each represent one of a range of different 
socially constructed relationships humans have 
with other animals. To Mija, Okja is a companion 
animal (pet); to the television naturalist she is a 
biological object; to the ALF group Okja is a 
sentient morally considerable being; to Lucy and 
Nancy Mirando Okja is a commercial object. The 
onscreen alliances, although troubled and with 
their points of moral difference, resolve into the 
pet owner and animal rights advocates against 
the scientific-corporate might of the animal-
industrial complex. As the director explained in 
an interview ‘Films either show animals as 
soulmates or else we see them in documentaries 
being butchered. I wanted to merge those 
worlds. The division makes us comfortable but 
the reality of that is they are the same animal’ 
(Gilbey 2017). The complex and contradictory 
relationships that humans have with other 
animals are offered back to viewers in a film that 
merges the anthropomorphic fantasies of 
animals as friends and companions with the 
brutal realities of animals as objects who are 
exploited, sliced apart and packaged for 
consumption. At one point in the film Mija’s 
grandfather picks up a red pencil and hastily 
draws horizontal and vertical lines across a 
photograph of Okja exclaiming “Blade! 
Shoulder! Loin! Spare rib! Hock! Got it? This is 
what will happen to her. This is Okja’s fate. Fate!” 
The act of visually dissecting Okja on a photogra- 
 
phic representation foregrounds the 
incongruities of human-animal relationships that 
inform the later narrative. A family photograph 
swiftly transforms into a butchery plan with only 
a few brief pencil strokes. Okja's ‘fate'-the 
normalisation of her slaughter for human 
consumption- described by marks on the 
photograph draws attention to her value as a 
material object, a body for dissection. In this way, 
the photographic representation is made 
uncomfortably ambiguous; both a representation 
of subjective matter- a living sentient being- and 
of a material object. In other ways, the film 
continually questions the contradictory nature of 
human relationships with other animals and 
makes clear that despite Mija thinking of Okja as 
a companion the young girl enjoys eating fish and 
chicken. In his attempt to pacify Mija after Okja 
has been taken away by the Mirando 
Corporation, the grandfather makes chicken stew 
which he says is Mija’s favourite. And, in an early 
scene, Mija recruits Okja to help her catch a fish 
for her meal later. Okja joyfully jumps into a lake 
displacing water and two fish so that Mija is then 
able to catch them easily, although she makes a 
point of returning the small (baby) fish back to 
the lake and taking only the fully grown (adult) 
fish. This act of ‘saving’ a baby animal is later 
mirrored at the end of the film when Okja 
rescues a super piglet from the slaughterhouse 
by hiding her inside her huge mouth.  
The Animal Liberation Front activists, 
although vegans, are not exempted by the 
narrative from moral incongruity. Their plan to 
rescue Okja is a ruse to exchange the ‘black box’ 
that records all Okja’s bodily information and 
which is attached to the underside of her ear, 
with a recording device that will enable the ALF 
group to gather incriminating video footage that 
can be released to the public thereby exposing 
the despicable activities of the Mirando 
Corporation. The activists intend throughout the 
initial rescue that Okja will be returned to the 
Mirando Corporation, and in doing so take a 
somewhat utilitarian ethical position that uses 
Okja as a means by which public attention can be 
drawn to the suffering of all the GM super pigs. 
Dr. Johnny is represented as a conflicted 
character, a television naturalist and fragile ego 
who struggles with his identity as both an ‘animal 
lover' and animal exploiter; a ‘sell out', who 
engineers the forced impregnation of Okja 
during a brutal scene that shifts the tone of the 
film   from   anthropomorphic   fantasy   to  cruel  
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reality. Meanwhile, Mirando CEO, Lucy, 
desperate to prove that she is unlike her 
psychotic father, plans to save the world from 
hunger and simultaneously address the 
environmental destruction caused by animal 
agriculture. However, what might be regarded 
as a worthy endeavour is shown as the narrative 
unfolds to be callous, animal cruelty, corporate 
greed and greenwashing. 
The viewer’s introduction to Okja and 
Mija’s relationship establishes the narrative 
similarities to other formulaic kids-who-love-
their-pet movies. Okja, a creature that is more 
hippo-dog hybrid than pig, emerges from a 
tranquil wooded landscape in the background of 
a  medium  shot  of  Mija  as  the young girl blows  
plumed seeds from a pod. Okja comes into focus 
as she approaches Mija and announces her 
presence with a subdued grunt before leaning 
gently against the young girl. A few head 
movements and some additional throaty sounds 
are enough for Mija to understand that Okja has 
a large spiked seed pod stuck in her foot. Mija 
duly removes it, telling Okja that it won’t hurt 
and, free from the discomfort, Okja bounds 
around like a puppy then rolls down the hillside 
and into a tree causing the fruit to fall to the 
ground. These early scenes establish the idyllic 
interspecies relationship between a child and 
companion animal: the beautiful setting; the 
ease of interspecies communications; Okja’s 
behavioural   similarities   with   a  dog  and  later  
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when she hugs Mija a human-like surrogate 
mother; and, the comic shot of Mija patting and 
stroking Okja’s buttock as a way to stimulate her 
to defecate on demand, all function to construct 
this as a traditional ‘pet movie’. Okja’s emotional 
capacities for happiness and fear are made clear 
through Mija’s dialogue and reinforced through 
the super pig’s dog-like behaviours. Her 
intelligence and agency are established using a 
conventional point of view shot to give the 
viewer a privileged ‘first-person’ perspective and 
an understanding of the super pig’s thoughts 
when the narrative suddenly takes a turn early 
on and Okja must save Mija from falling to a 
certain death. In the melodramatic ‘animal 
rescues child’ scene, the point of view shot 
follows Okja’s line of sight as she works out how 
to use a tree branch as a fulcrum point  that  will  
propel Mija to safety while Okja falls to her own 
uncertain fate into the trees. This crude but 
effective cinematic convention places the viewer 
in Okja’s position following her thinking as she 
works out how to save Mija. Agency and 
intention are bound up in the ordering and use 
of point of view, eyeline match and reaction 
shots that invite viewer identification with the 
super pig while the formulaic narrative of animal 
sacrifice out of love or loyalty for a human are 
played out early in the film. 
The rescue scene appears at first to 
finish with a long shot of Mija and Okja hugging 
although the overtly anthropomorphic figure of 
Okja adopting a bipedal-type pose to give a 
‘motherly’ embrace to Mija is undercut by the 
viewer’s distance from the girl and pig which 
gives   a   voyeuristic   feel   to   this   sentimental  
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moment. Over two shots the camera withdraws  
to what at first feels like a respectful distance 
from which to observe the embrace but then 
pulls back a little more to allow a few branches 
to blur into the left of the frame and give the 
sense of ‘peaking’ from behind the foliage at 
their embrace. This is not, however, the final 
shot and the scene has not finished. It instead 
cuts to a short sequence of three shots that 
begins with a close-up of Mija gently lifting Okja’s 
ear to whisper to her. This is not continuous 
action from the preceding shot and therefore 
the viewer is made aware that some 
indeterminate amount of time has passed. It is 
though, a continuation of intimacy between Mija 
and Okja but due to the shift in time and space 
indicated by the discontinuous action, the close-
up is incongruous and disconnected from the 
previous long shot. Moreover, the viewer cannot 
hear what is said by Mija to Okja and in the 
absence of hearing what is happening in the 
shot, the image invites an alternative embodied 
response. The dynamic shift from a long shot of 
touch (the hug) which can be viewed objectively, 
voyeuristically and anthropomorphically to the 
close-up of touch (the whisper in the ear) alters 
the sense of intimacy between Mija and Okja. 
The distanced anthropomorphic optical image of 
interspecies touch that seems to be a suitably 
cliched shot to end the scene is destabilised by 
the close-up haptic image that denies the viewer 
access to what is being said and in doing so 
grants privilege to the sensual experience of the 
whisper. In this case, the inability to ‘hear’ 
functions in the same way as a lack of visual 
information to invite an embodied response to 
the image. The visual intimacy is such that 
according to usual cinematic conventions the 
viewer should be close enough to hear but in 
being unable to do so the image engages the 
viewer with ‘the feel’ rather than ‘the heard’ of 
the whisper. The shot that follows is a close-up 
reaction shot in which Okja’s eye moves, she 
blinks, her pupil dilates, and her eyebrow 
twitches in response to Mija whispering in her 
ear, all of which invites an identification with the 
pig rather than the human. It then cuts to 
another close-up of Mija holding Okja’s ear, the 
accompanying music is gentle and lilting. The 
sound and image abruptly cut to the first shot of 
the next scene, an overhead shot of a meal. ‘Ta-
da’ exclaims Mija’s grandfather as he removes 
the lid from a pot to reveal the whole dead body  
of the fish Mija and Okja caught earlier, now 
presented floating in a brown watery stew. The 
scene change is jarring; the emotional shift from 
interspecies embodied connection and viewer 
identification with another animal’s subjectivity, 
to the shot of the fish, a food object apparently 
without moral value raise the question of whose 
body matters. 
Okja attends to the sensual 
relationships that humans have with other 
animals, particularly those who are classified as 
food. The taste and touch of the super pigs 
feature prominently throughout the film with 
Okja’s subjectivity being repeatedly contrasted 
with the bodies of animals as commodities and 
food objects. Haptic imagery amplifies this 
unstable classification of Okja as both 
companion and food, as subject and object. 
When Dr. Johnny and the film crew arrive at 
Okja's hilltop home, the tv naturalist's desperate 
need to quench his thirst is overtaken by his 
desire to touch Okja. The camera tracks him in a 
medium shot as he strides towards Okja, his 
attention on her head as he reaches out and runs 
his hands over her nose and foreface. He does 
not meet Okja's gaze nor does he give any 
indication that he acknowledges her as a 
sentient being, his gaze and hands continuing to 
move over her body despite Okja’s obvious 
discomfort. The medium shot cuts to a close-up 
of Dr. Johnny's hand with short dirty fingernails 
slowly caressing Okja's body, the detailed 
texture of her thickened rough skin, each hair 
and follicle filling the frame. The sound of the 
human hand moving across Okja’s body 
amplifies the haptic visuality of the image that 
invites the viewer to sense how a super pig 
would feel to the touch. The intimacy of the 
close-up and the identification with Dr. Johnny's 
touch being imposed on Okja is unnerving. It is a 
touch that is unwanted, objectionable yet 
sensuous, a touch that invites the viewer to feel 
Okja, a moment of uncanny haptic visuality that 
is uncomfortable because of its sensuality. Dr. 
Johnny runs his hands back along the skin that 
fills the frame but is now dissociated from Okja 
as a subjective being and instead only the 
covering of a bodily mass. The naturalist’s face 
fills the frame as he demands to be filmed saying 
‘you can’t fake these emotions’ before pressing 
his nose, face and open mouth to Okja’s skin in 
the rapture of sensual desire. The camera crew 
begins   to   film   Dr. Johnny  who  is  framed in a  
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medium shot that only allows for Okja's 
massive head to share the frame with him. In 
his piece to the camera he tells his audience 
that he has known Okja as data from the black 
box in her ear, but now ‘studying her with my 
eyes and hands' he declares ‘she amazes me 
even more'. A shot of Dr. Johnny staring wide-
eyed at Okja’s huge single pendulous teat and 
nipple before touching it and declaring Okja to 
be ‘truly exceptional’ serves to intensify the 
uncomfortably sexual tone of his interaction 
with her. Later in the film, the television 
naturalist orchestrates Okja’s forced sexual 
encounter with an enormous male super pig, 
the gendered dynamics of the scene and the 
dialogue as well as the viewer's identification 
with Okja leaving little narrative space to 
understand this encounter as anything other 
than a rape. Dr. Johnny then uses a phallic 
shaped tubular extraction tool to take meat 
samples from Okja's body. Holding the 
implement as a pseudo-penis, Dr. Johnny tells 
Okja ‘I'm gonna poke you in five places. I’m 
sorry. It’s gonna hurt’. After declaring ‘I'm an 
animal lover. Everyone knows that about me' 
Dr. Johnny rams the extraction implement into 
Okja's side. This is followed by a fast cut to an 
overhead shot of the meat samples taken from 
Okja’s body sizzling on a griddle plate and being 
carefully sliced. Served to an older white man, 
a young white boy, and an older white woman, 
they    each    respond    with    the     comments 
  ‘fuck yeah’ and ‘that was the best I’ve 
ever had. The best of the best’, continuing the 
disconcerting sexualisation and objectification 
of Okja’s body. In this way, the film invites 
viewers repeatedly to engage through visual 
and haptic imagery with Okja as an embodied 
subjectivity contrasted with Okja as ‘meat’, as 
sexualised object, as component parts to be 
butchered, and the bodies of other animals as 
food or snacks, valued only for their taste and 
price.   
Animal bodies 
An object/subject/value nexus as it pertains to 
animals other than humans can be summarised 
generally through dualities that, dependent 
upon the contextualising discourse, privilege one 
value above another such that broadly speaking 
when their subjectivity is acknowledged the 
animal attracts moral value while the animal-as-
object is primarily aligned with economic value. 
Although these are somewhat clumsy 
distinctions and of course prone to the ambiguity 
of cultural and social norms that ‘naturalise’ the 
instrumental relations humans have with other 
species, the value accorded to another being and 
their consequent treatment nonetheless bears a 
relationship to the extent to which we 
understand other animals as having subjectivity 
or as objects. Okja engages with these 
distinctions and in doing so deals with subject 
matter  that  previously  was  mainly   confined to  
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documentaries about animal agriculture, animal 
rights, and environmentalism. The film thus 
contextualises the animals’ experiences within 
their historical, political and material realities in 
ways that might invite simulative empathy. 
Representations of touch figure 
prominently throughout the film where 
interspecies touch between human and pig is 
intimate, sensual and sexualised. Technological 
touch such as the electric prods used to force the 
animals up the chute into the slaughterhouse, 
the metal stun box that clasps the super pigs 
tight, the captive bolt gun fired into the head of 
each pig, and the meat extraction tool used by Dr 
Johnny all function to intensify the violence of 
human touch at a distance. But, touch also makes 
us aware of the materiality of bodies and the haptic 
images in Okja invite the embodied viewer to 
question the complex relationships that humans 
have with other embodied subjectivities. In this 
way, phenomenological approaches to analysis 
make us attentive to the political where it is 
acknowledged that cultural knowledge is 
embodied. Nonetheless, it is important to 
recognise that viewer identifications with Okja are 
invited through traditional cinematic conventions, 
the intentional construction of a CGI character who 
behaves like a dog (1), as well as through the 
imagery of interspecies touch that calls on viewers 
to engage bodily with sense memory connections. 
Where mediation creates ocularcentric distance, 
the embodied encounter with film can destabilise 
this  although  intimacy  and  embodied  contact 
with other animals is, as Okja illustrates 
complicated. Does Okja need to behave like a 
dog for viewers to readily engage with her 
identification? Why can’t Okja only be a pig 
rather than a pig-hippo-dog hybrid? It would be 
preferable to acknowledge the subjectivity of 
another animal without that creature having to 
have some qualities that are easily associated 
with a species to which moral value is easily 
assigned. In other words, a pig shouldn’t have to 
be comparable with a dog to be granted moral 
value in a narrative. However, I return to my 
recollection of the puppy and the chicken and 
my sensory experience of bodily similitude 
through which I came to recognise their moral 
parity. It is this that gives me pause for thought. 
Notes 
(1) Bong Joon-ho discusses how Okja was developed to have the 
mass, weight and movement of a hippo and the eyes and 
behavioural characteristics of a dog. See: Jung, 2017. 
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